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ALEXANDER M. BICKEL AND
THE POST-REALIST CONSTITUTION
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.*
While Alexander Bickel's premature death at the age of forty-nine
was a personal tragedy for his family and friends, it was an intellectual
loss of almost equal proportion for his wide and varied audience.** Co-
gent, honest, humane, and always independent, Bickel's published writ-
ings form a coherent body of political commentary, legal analysis, con-
stitutional history, and political philosophy. At its best his work has a
range and subtlety that will give it perennial value. Bickel focused on
institutional conflicts that he conceived of as "enduring," rejecting easy
formulas and probing into complexities. "It is the tension that interests
me,"' 1 he once wrote, and indeed it was his perception and exploration of
fundamental institutional tensions that gave his work its own enduring
quality.
There was tension, too, in Bickel's own mind: tension between his
admiration for the Supreme Court as an institution and his commitment to
the politics of democracy; between his philosophical acceptance of ethical
relativism and his personal sense of fundamental moral values; between
his recognition of the subjective element in judicial decision and his
demand for "neutral" principles of law; between his belief in the neces-
sity for a fundamentally just politics and his sense of the essential need for
compromise and accommodation; between his espousal of certain forms
of civil disobedience and his fear about the fragility of a democratic social
order; and, finally, between his life-long faith in the possibilities and
achievements of reason and his recognition that reason itself was ulti-
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College, 1962; M.A. University of Kansas, 1964; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, 1968.
During 1971-72 Dr. Purcell was the Charles Warren Fellow in Legal History at the
Harvard Law School. His The Crisis of Democratic Theory was the winner of the 1972
Frederick Jackson Turner Award of the Organization of American Historians.
**Tributes to Alexander Bickel's character have already become legion. I had the
opportunity to meet him only once, when I was asking for his scholarly aid. To the request
of an unknown student he responded immediately, generously, and with great personal
kindness.
I A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT x (1973) [hereinafter cited as THE
WARREN COURT].
522 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
mately nondeterminative. The real strength of Bickel's work, its moral
seriousness and intellectual tenacity, resides not just in the institutional
complexities that he explored, but in the intellectual tensions that he
himself tried constantly to master and then to transform into insight. The
tensions gave his thought a sophistication and a dynamism, but never
ennervated his judgment. Alexander Bickel could always make up his
mind.
Indeed, his readiness to render judgments on important and contro-
versial issues made him a natural polemicist and contributed to his pro-
vocative and brilliant classroom style. His scholarship was never aimed
solely at scholars, for the thrust of his work always reached beyond the
specific subject to comment on immmediately relevant problems of law
and politics. His prose could glitter and slash. From the early critics of
Brown v. Board of Education2 to the later defenders of the Warren
Court, judges, scholars, politicians, and reformers all suffered his discom-
forting attention. In the classroom he was equally forceful, challenging a
generation of Yale Law School students. His style and fervor could
convert or alienate, but it hardly failed to stimulate. Bickel's course in
constitutional law was like "a brisk cold shower in that early morning of
our law careers," declared the editors of the Yale Law Journal.3 "He
inspired us with a vision of the law as the highest and most careful
application of our powers of reason."
I
In spite of internal tensions and, on occasion, doubts, Bickel consis-
tently held several cardinal principles over the course of his twenty-five
year career. Perhaps foremost was his faith in reason, whatever its limita-
tions, and his total rejection of anything that smacked of nihilism. He
chose the reasoned life for himself, suggested its desirability to others,
and insisted on it in the institutions of the law. Further, he emphasized
that American government was based on a paradox, for it was "princi-
pled self-government. ' ' 4 Self-government meant that the elective
branches should ordinarily carry the burdens of policy decision and, in
case of irreconcilable conflict with the courts, ultimately prevail. "Prin-
cipled" meant that the government should honor certain fundamental
values, and that the Supreme Court's special role was to elaborate and,
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
a In Memory ofAlexander M. Bickel (1924-1974), 84 YALE L.J. 197 (1974).
4 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at ix.
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if necessary, defend them. Before the Court could authoritatively pro-
nounce such principles, however, it had to be as certain as possible that
they were clear, practical, culturally warranted, and "neutral." "The
Court is to reason, not feel, to explain and justify principles it pronounces
to the last possible rational decimal point." 5 Such a demanding require-
ment of rationality was to ensure as much objectivity as possible, to limit
severely the number and kind of constitutional decisions the Court could
enter, and to provide the broadest scope and responsibility to the elective
branches ,of government. Finally, Bickel believed that all democratic
institutions and all social tranquility rested on the broad and freely given
consent of the governed. Disregard of the need for consent was not only
morally wrong but practically disastrous, for without consent both the
rule of law and democratic self-government were impossible.
Bickel's maturing thought developed out of a context marked by
three major and closely interrelated influences. Politically, he was old
enough to share in the acute memory of the "old" Supreme Court with
all its excesses, while young enough to give himself wholeheartedly to
the emerging civil rights movement. Intellectually, he came of age in the
immediate post-war years and was caught up in the cross currents gener-
ated by the legal realists and their opponents. And personally, he was
deeply influenced not only by the Harvard Law School tradition, perhaps
best exemplified in his day by Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., but also
more directly by his growing personal friendship with Justice Felix
Frankfurter, whom Bickel would come to see as "in his time the single
most influential figure in American constitutional law.' '-6
By the late forties, when Bickel entered the Harvard Law School,
the "old" pre-1937 Supreme Court had been widely condemned and
repudiated. "The debris of 20 years or so of judicial wrongheadedness
had to be swept away," he later commented.' The long struggle with the
"old" Court had become legendary, and the "conservative" Justices
were known as "the Four Horsemen" or, in Learned Hand's phrase,
"the Battalion of Death. ' 8 The dissenting Holmes-Brandeis wing had
5 A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MORALITY
OF CONSENT].
6 Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science of Law: Writings of the Harvard Period, in
FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 164, 168 (NV. Mendelson ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBUTE].
7 Bickel, Justice Frankfitrter at Seventy-Five, 137 NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 1957, at
7,9.
8 Quoted in letter from Felix Frankfurter to Bickel, Feb. 13, 1958, FRANKFURTER
PAPERS, Library of Congress, Box 65, folder 1265.
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triumphed, and it seemed to have convinced most of the profession, at
least in the law schools, that the fatal flaw before 1937 had been a
willingness to read personal values into the Constitution. Some scholars
argued that such subjective preferences unavoidably guided constitutional
adjudication, but the more common view was that judicial disinterested-
ness and restraint could reduce the influence of personal values to an
absolute minimum. When constitutional disagreements arose in the for-
ties and early fifties, justices and legal scholars on both sides of questions
came to charge each other with the ultimate transgression - giving
constitutional sanction to personal prejudices. Committed to the ideal of
judicial reason, and convinced that the disastrous history of the "old"
Court stemmed from its subjectivism, Bickel became convinced of the
importance of developing a theory and practice that would ensure as total
a judicial neutrality as was humanly possible.
While Bickel was convinced of the absolute importance of distin-
guishing personal values from constitutional principles, he was equally
caught up in the enthusiasm of the civil rights movement of the fifties. He
was convinced of its rightness, and convinced too that the general line of
Brown v. Board of Education9 and its early progeny was proper constitu-
tional law. "The court in this instance was right," he wrote to Justice
Frankfurter, "deeply, morally right, in tune with the finest thought and
feeling that our tradition offers, and in tune with the world that is abuild-
ing. '"10 His commitment led him to support constitutional innovation,
political demonstrations, and even some forms of civil disobedience. It
led also to an important side career as a political essayist for the New
Republic which helped bring him national attention and influence. That
position toughened his thought by drawing him into problems of practi-
cally implementing politically controversial Court decisions. And, more
importantly, it forced him to try to distinguish the acknowledged constitu-
tional innovation and moral assumptions in Brown from the "wrong-
headedness" and judicial subjectivism that he condemned in the "old"
Court.
The continuing, though often disguised, debate over legal realism
equally helped to channel Bickel's thought. On the surface he rejected the
realists, scorned such extremists as Thurman Arnold, and dismissed them
both as "now a small and somewhat forlorn number of individuals.""
0 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 Letter from Bickel to Felix Frankfurter, Sept. 10, 1958 (apparent date),
FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Library of Congress, Box 24, folder 357.
1 Bickel, Philosophy of a Legal Realist, 144 NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 1961, at 30.
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Bickel recognized that realism had made positive contributions to Ameri-
can jurisprudence, especially in exposing the simplicities of constitutional
literalism, but he preferred to dismiss it as merely "a first wisdom."' 2
He emphasized instead its failures, primarily the unrealistic conclusion
"that behind all judicial dialectic there was personal preference and per-
sonal power and nothing else.' '1 3 Realism, Bickel believed, tended to-
ward nihilism and cynicism. Such charges were understandable and, in
part, fair. They were the common staple of the anti-realist reaction of the
late thirties and forties, caused by the excesses of the realists themselves,
by the desperate need in the face of Nazism and Stalinism for a belief in
the "rationality" of law, and by the maturation of the New Deal Court
which forced scholars to ask different and more challenging questions
about the nature of law.
Bickel entered the legal profession when the anti-realist reaction was
losing the vituperative quality that had characterized its early phase and
was beginning to coalesce around a more positive and sophisticated
approach, the theory of "reasoned elaboration." Developed by a number
of prominent scholars, and dominating the Forewords to the Harvard
Law Review's annual appraisals of the past Supreme Court term, the
theory of reasoned elaboration maintained that the Supreme Court ought
to be and could be "a voice of reason, charged with the creative function
of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and
durable principles of constitutional law."' 14 Sufficient time, careful
analysis, adequate craftsmanship, sensitivity to the nuances of cultural
values and social changes, and faith in the capacity of reason itself,
declared Henry Hart, one of the theory's leading formulators, could bring
about "the maturing of collective thought" among the Justices and gen-
erate general agreement on the existence and applicability of valid and
neutral principles. 15 Hart, Herbert Wechsler and the other scholars who
helped refine the idea of reasoned elaboration sustained Bickel's com-
mitment to reason, and he drew on their work repeatedly. Maturing
collective thought, neutral and enduring constitutional principles, and
rationally persuasive opinions, he believed, were all possible and neces-
12 TRIBUTE, supra note 6, at 171.
13 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 80 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH].
"4 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 99 (1959). For a general survey of the development of
reasoned elaboration see White, The Evoltion of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 (1973).
" Hart, supra note 14, at 100.
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sary. In one of his first essays, Bickel joined the growing chorus of critics
who deplored logical flaws in recent Court decisions. Some opinions, he
maintained, did "not attempt to gain reasoned acceptance for the result,"
and hence failed to "make law in the sense which the term 'law' must
have in a democratic society." 16
While Bickel's standards were clearly stated, however, major prob-
lems remained, for he was also a child, or perhaps grandchild, of realism
itself. In fact, much of Bickel's intellectual achievement came from the
fact that, despite his rejection of realism as a whole, he did not ignore its
contributions but rather accepted them and tried to make them parts of a
broader and more complete legal theory. Bickel concurred with the
realists' rejection of the notions that judges "found" law or that their
decisions were mechanical or logically compelled. He accepted the con-
tention that judges in fact "made" law, that they often had a range of
choices open to them, and that individual, personal factors influenced
their decisions. He emphasized, too, the need for complete candor in
dealing with such non-ideal realities.
Like Justice Frankfurter before him, Bickel used this theory of-the
judicial process derived from realism to support his argument for judicial
restraint. Since judicial decisions, and especially constitutional decisions,
were often in some significant part the result of value judgments, the
Supreme Court could seldom justify opposition to Congressional or
executive policies on the ground that the "law" of the Constitution was
clear or simple. Instead, the law was a pragmatic process, an instrument
of social order. It was a changing phenomenon, based on social needs,
subject to empirical study, and ultimately to be judged only in terms of its
practical consequences. Viewing law as an institutional process, Bickel
consistently emphasized "its inextricable involvement in politics."1 "
Steadily probing for the social consequences of judicial decisions, he
rested his fierce assault on the Warren Court in the late sixties on the
proposition that its major decisions were producing contradictory and
self-defeating consequences. Since satisfactory historical consequences
could validate almost anything, however, in The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress he was forced to concede "the future may yet belong to
16 Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5, (1957). Bickel's concern with the development of
reasoned rules showed itself in his very first essay published the year after he had graduated
from law school. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the
Federal Courts in Matters of Admirality, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1949).
17 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 133.
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the Warren Court," in the unlikely event that its majority had guessed
right when "they bet on the future."' 18
Bickel accepted two additional, and perhaps intellectually more
challenging, assumptions that underlay realism: ethical relativism and an
instrumentalist concept of reason. Although Bickel would sometimes talk
of moral values that were simply "right," the most he could logically
admit in theory were "organizing ideas of universal validity in the given
universe of a culture and a place."' 19 This was a rather misleading state-
ment because the latter phrase totally altered the normal significance of
"universal validity." "It was obvious," he commented in a different con-
text, "that a moral judgment as Justice Holmes noted cannot be said to be
correct or incorrect." 2 0 That observation was characteristic of Bickel,
and logically necessary for him because of his belief in the instrumentalist
nature of reason. Human reason, he assumed, could deduce formal corol-
laries from given axioms, or it could empirically examine consequences
of given experiments, but it could not "demonstrate" moral truth. A
value judgment was not rational "in the sense that reason compels it," he
admitted. "It is a choice, and perhaps it would be as well to call it
arational.' '12 Hence, reason, Bickel's chosen standard, was not itself
ultimate, and though he rejected realism as a sufficient legal theory,
Bickel lived in the intellectual world it had helped create.
II
After graduation from law school in 1949 Bickel clerked for Judge
Calvert Magruder, served in the State Department, and then in 1952
began his term as law clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Bickel admired
and respected the Justice, and was quite sympathetic to his well known
views on the role and function of the Supreme Court. The respect was
soon returned, and the two men became close friends. Frankfurter
quickly came to appreciate Bickel's outstanding abilities, as well as his
"high discretion, old-style courtesy, appreciation, and loyalty," and he
placed him among the foremost of the "extraordinary lot of able fellows"
who had served him. 22 For his part, Bickel came to see the Justice as
18 A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13, 173 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as IDEA OF PROGRESS].
19 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 199.
2 0 Id. at42.
21 Id. at 226.
"2 Letters from Felix Frankfurter to Erwin Griswold, Apr. 13, 1956 and Apr. 10,
1956, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 24, folder 356 (copies).
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embodying a "splendid and a rare career" which had been pursued
"without compromise of principle, indeed with an utter inability to so
much as modulate moral and intellectual integrity.
' 2 3
Neither of them could have failed to note the striking similarity in
their backgrounds: both were eastern European Jews who had immigrated
with their families to the United States as young boys, settled in New
York, attended City College, and graduated from the Harvard Law
School. Frankfurter had gone on, not to clerk for, but nevertheless to
become a friend, confidant, and near-disciple of Holmes and Brandeis,
two of the most important and renowned Justices in the history of the
Supreme Court. Both of these men were graduates of the Harvard Law
School as well, and one was also the descendant of a Jewish immigrant
family from central Europe. The parallel obviously suggested itself that
Bickel might enjoy a similar relationship with an important and renowned
Justice.
Frankfurter loved to collect friends and enjoyed the role of teacher.
He had, too, as one scholar has noted, "a yearning for disciplds." '2 4
Frankfurter moved to make the connection official, first by encouraging
Bickel's participation with professor Paul A. Freund, himself an ex-clerk
of Justice Brandeis and an intimate friend of Frankfurter's, in the schol-
arly mining of the rich Brandeis papers, and second by trying as force-
fully as possible within the bounds of discretion to secure for Bickel a
permanent position on the Harvard Law School faculty in 1956. 25 The
latter effort; made without Bickel's knowledge, was unsuccessful, and
Bickel subsequently accepted a position at the Yale Law School, which
he held until his death. The Justice and the young scholar became increas-
ingly identified and, Frankfurter thought, some of Bickel's latr - 'work
drew critical fire that was really aimed at him. "I'll tell the world,"
Bickel wrote the Justice in late 1957, "I have received so much of
pleasure and of lasting good from you that I can easily stand to take a little
punishment in your behalf."
26
The writing in question was Bickel's first book, The Unpublished
Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in which he acknowledged Frankfurter
23 Bickel, supra note 7, at 7.
2" Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in FRom THE DIARIEs OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 75
(1975).
2' Letter from Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Jan. 10, 1955, FRANKFURTER PAPERS,
Box 56, folder 1066; letters from Frankfurter to Griswold, supra note 22.
2(3 Letter from Bickel to Frankfurter, Sept. 10, 1957, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 24,
folder 357.
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as an "inspiration." "My intellectual debt to him is immense." ' 27 To say
that the book was a collection of ten memoranda and drafts that Brandeis
had decided not to hand down is scarcely to suggest the richness of the
documents or the brilliance of Bickel's accompanying analysis. The book
is, in brief, one of the most illuminating works of Supreme Court scholar-
ship in existence. Perhaps its major flaw was its utterly dull title, one
guaranteed to minimize general interest and provoke unconcerned yawns.
Bickel had originally planned to call it A Climate of Dissent, but
Frankfurter insisted that such a title misrepresented the significance of
Brandeis' work. He suggested, instead, that Bickel choose something
completely bland," proving in that instance to be a less 'than wholly
felicitous inspiration.2 8
The book itself was a triumph of scholarship. Much of the success
was due, of course, to the materials with which Bickel worked. Brandels
had been an extraordinary judge, and the papers he left behind were, in
Frankfurter's words, "absolutely unparalleled." 2 9 Additionally, the
main issues involved were the constitutional problems of social and
economic regulation paramount during Brandeis' tenure, issues which
had been basically settled by the fifties and about which there was a
general political consensus. Hence Bickel could assume an audience
sympathetic to Brandeis and in agreement on the moral contour of the
period.
Bickel made the most of these considerable initial advantages. The
strength of the Unpublished Opinions comes not just from the materials,
but from the way the editor elaborated them and used them to illuminate
Brandeis' judicial mind, the inner workings of theSupreme Court as a
human institution, and, above all, the elusive but real process of
"reason" at work in the law. The book's historical contributions were
many, tracing the evolution of particular Supreme Court decisions
through the often conflicting tangle of personalities, precedents, and poli-
tics that energized the Court. Beyond the history and beyond the detail,
however, loomed the real theoretical burden of the book. Bickel's consis-
tent argument, supported by the weight of many of the cases, was that the
process of constitutional adjudication, though one of subtle human and
27 A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDIES ix (1957)
[hereinafter cited as UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS].
28 Letter from Frankfurter to Bickel, Aug. 29, 1956, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 24,
folder 356.
29 Letter from Frankfurter to Griswold, Apr. 13, 1956, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box
24, folder 356 (copy).
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institutional demands, nevertheless could be and often was a process of
disinterested and open-minded rational analysis guided by evidence and
existing legal rules. To show that this was true in general about Brandeis
proved that the ideal of reason was possible; to show that it was true in
significant part even on the "old" court proved that the ideal had an
institutional embodiment.
Bickel focused on the personal and intellectual qualities that gave
Brandeis his special "effectiveness as an advocate within the Court."
30
Because of the Justice's tact and craftsmanship he helped save state
workmen's compensation statutes from Court disapproval; because of his
forcefulness in analyzing social and economic consequences, he pushed
the Court to adopt a more realistic approach to state taxation of goods in
interstate commerce; because of his insistence upon the disinterested
application of Court doctrine he helped induce a majority to relieve the
United Mine Workers of liability, and limit the reach of the federal
courts, in the first Coronado case. 31 And, of course, because at least
some of the Justices, who for various reasons, preferred the opposite
results, could be reached by Brandeis' arguments, his ideas proved that
there was something substantial to the ideal of disinterested reason in the
development of constitutional law.
3 2
Bickel found three additional qualities in Brandeis that he especially
admired and would consistently draw on in his later writings. First, he
appreciated the way the Justice strove to give judicial effect to the under-
lying policy of legislative efforts by examining the practical purpose of
statutes rather than by measuring them by abstract judicial principle.
33
Second, he was drawn to Brandeis' sense of jurisdictional integrity, his
sense that procedural restrictions on judicial power were fundamental to a
reasoned process of adjudication. Third, and closely related to the sec-
ond, he was deeply impressed with Brandeis' sense of constitutional
restraint, his "conviction that the Court must take the utmost pains to
avoid precipitate decision of constitutional issues. 34 He pointed to the
Justice's concurrence in Ashivander v. T. V.A.,35 which enumerated a
variety of techniques for disposing of cases without reaching a constitu-
30 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 27, at 101.
31 United Mineworkers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
32 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 27, at chs. 4, 5, 6. See also Bickel, The
Battle Over Brandeis, 151 NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 1964, at 25-26.
33 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 27, ch. 8.34 Id. at 2, 3.
12 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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tional principle, as the "crowning statement of one of the truly major
themes in Brandeis' judicial work."
36
Bickel's handling of the jurisdictional theme was undoubtedly influ-
enced by Frankfurter's continual insistence on a fastidious adherence to
procedural limitations. In the same year that the Unpublished Opinions
appeared, Frankfurter maintained in a dissenting opinion that the Bran-
deis legacy was being increasingly distorted. 37 Brandeis' well-known
concern for the development of law "appropriate for an evolving society
has more and more prevailed," Frankfurter declared, while his equally
important arguments for wise technicalities and limitations "have often
been neglected." ' 38 To redress the balance Frankfurter emphasized the
latter half of the Brandeis legacy throughout his years on the Court.
Bickel absorbed that emphasis from him, and later called it "the really
constructive part" of Frankfurter's judicial career.
39
Purposely, therefore, Bickel chose for his first chapter a case4" in
which Brandeis, persuaded that a suit was jurisdictionally improper, pre-
vented the formation of a majority which might have used the appeal to
uphold the second federal child labor law. The case was powerful evi-
dence "of the rigid integrity with which Brandeis adhered to his jurisdic-
tional scruples, no matter if to do so was to oppose a substantive result he
himself desired." 4 1 That episode came to stand in Bickel's mind not only
for Brandeis' integrity but more importantly for the idea that procedural
restrictions, though often denigrated or ignored, were in fact the essence
of a reasoned legal process. For procedure, in the long run at least, had a
sense of neutrality about it, an aura of institutional disinterestedness, that
alone could restrain devisive conflict over substantive issues and serve as
a social unifier. "Mr. Frankfurter shared with Brandeis the conviction,"
Bickel wrote, "that 'the history of liberty is to a large extent the history of
procedural observances.' "42 More immediately, given his instrumen-
talist view of reason, he saw proceduralism as the most fruitful guarantee
of judicial rationality. For procedure was institutional method, and
method was the one thing that instrumental reason could "objectively"
and persuasively evaluate. Procedure could be steadily made and kept
36 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 27, at 2.
" Ferguson v. Moore-MeCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 524-25 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
I8 d. See also TRIBUTE, supra note 6, at 188.
a Quoted in Lash, supra note 24, at 82.
4' Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
41 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 27, at 17.
42 TRIBUTE, supra note 6, at 188.
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"rational" in a way that substantive law could not, and hence procedure
was, in long-range and systematic terms, the most fundamental and prom-
ising area of the law. The equation between reason, procedure, judicial
disinterestedness, and, ultimately, social cohesion ran through all of Bic-
kel's thought and it too may surely be called a "truly major theme." In
his last book Bickel would insist on the same idea. "Legal technicalities
are the stuff of the law," he declared, "and piercing through a particular
substance to get to procedures suitable to many substances is in fact what
the task of law most often is." 4 3 That was also the task of reason, and it
was the one task that instrumental reason could properly fulfill.
III
While Bickel was finishing the Unpublished Opinions, he found
himself increasingly involved in the civil rights movement that had accel-
erated after Brown. Though always aware of the limits and danger of
judicial innovation in constitutional law, Bickel gave himself actively and
fervently to the cause of racial equality and to the defense of the desegre-
gation cases. While achieving intergration would be a long and slow
process, he believed the nation had to pursue the goal relentlessly. Coun-
sels of "moderation," he maintained, are "so often in our day the last
refuge of the totally fatuous." ' 4 4 In November, 1955 he published a long
analysis of the "Original Understanding" of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to give Brown scholarly support. 45 He argued persuasively that
the Framers did not expect the amendment to apply in their immediate
historical context to segration and many other forms of racial discrimina-
tion, but that they had purposely chosen language that would lend itself to
proper constitutional growth when and where necessary. "The record of
history, properly understood," he concluded, "left the way open to, in
fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material state of the Union
in 1954, not 1866. " 4 The historical materials did seem to show that the
way had been left open, but the stronger phrase "in fact invited" was
Alexander Bickel speaking. The next year he publicly repudiated ex-
Justice James F. Byrnes' attempt to misrepresent his essay as criticizing
'3 MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 121.
44 Bickel, Integration: The Second Year in Perspective, 135 Naw REPUBLIC, Oct. 8,
1956, at 12, See also Bickel, Correspondence: Paths to Desegregation, 137 NEW REPUB-
LIC, Nov. 4, 1957, at 3, 22-23.
45 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 261. This chapter was originally published
as The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. I (1955).
1 Old. at 65.
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Brown and forcefully insisted that "the evidence was precisely as the
Court had held."
47
The significance of the civil rights movement for Bickel's constitu-
tional thought was, of course, that it created a sharp tension between his
Frankfurterian ideas of restraint and the moral demands of desegregation
which seemed to necessitate at least some degree of judicial "activism."
"For many years we have been paralyzed in two of the institutions of
government which give us national expression- the Congress and the
Executive," he declared in 1956. "It remained for the third, the only one
in which a matter can be pressed to unavoidable decision by private
parties, the Supreme Court, to quicken the conscience of the nation." 48
Praising the Court's initiative, he urged his readers to join the struggle.
"In the grip of a moral dilemma," he proclaimed, "can we do better thani
to take refuge in the Court's law?"
49
His "Original Understanding" essay had been based on three inter-
related presuppositions that lent themselves readily to judicial activism:
the validity of the judicial application of the vague phrases of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the capacity of those phrases for growth and change
in meaning, and the acceptance of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
constitutional arbiter of that meaning. Though a theory of judicial re-
straint was still possible with such assumptions, they made the problem
more complicated. Brandeis himself, in the days of the "old" Court, had
privately approved the idea of repealing the whole Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while Frankfurter had equally strong doubts, more so about the
"due process" than the "equal protection" clause.5 0 In the late fifties
Frankfurter still confessed to wishing "that when the Amendment first
came before the Court it had concluded that it was too vague, too much
open to subjective interpretation for judicial enforceability." 51 In the face
of Frankfurter's continuing doubts, as well as the more extreme doubts of
the widely respected Judge Learned Hand, Bickel remained firm. "I am
persuaded the function of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and under the Bill of Rights is necessary in our society," he wrote
47 Bickel, Frankfurter's Former Clerk Disputes Byrnes's Statement, 40 U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, June 15, 1956, at 132.
11 Bickel, Integration: The Second Year in Perspective, 135 NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 8,
1956, at 12.
49 Id.
5o See Lash, supra note 24, at 35.
1 Letter from Bickel to Frankfurter, July 31, 1958 (apparent date), FRANKFURTER
PAPERS, Box 24, folder 357; letter from Frankfurter to Learned Hand, Feb. 13, 1958,
FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 65, folder 1255. See also TRIBUTE, supra note 6, at 175-76.
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the Justice. In spite of the challenging problems it created, "I am so
persuaded on principle."
52
In defense of the Court and the desegregation cases Bickel used the
pages of the New Republic to attack the "Southern Manifesto" of 1956
and the 1958 report of the Conference of State Chief Justices, terming the
latter both "inexplicable" and "inexcusable." 53 Both were based on the
idea that the Constitution was a "clear" and relatively unchanging
document, and both used that idea to charge the Court with legislating
values rather than applying law. Bickel rejected their claim bluntly.
"Laws are made, interpreted and applied by men," he declared, "and at
no stage is the process a mechanical one. ' 54 Frankfurter expressed qual-
ified agreement with the latter attack but worried about the activist impli-
cations of stressing the range and necessity of judicial discretion. "Of
course one does not want to give aid and comfort to the [segregationist]
enemy," the Justice wrote him, "but neither does one want unwittingly
to withdraw whatever influences one may have for curbing judicial wil-
fulness and partisanship." 55
Acutely aware of the potential for conflict between his enthusiasm
for the desegregation cases and his broader belief in judicial limitation,
Bickel turned to the task of theoretical reconciliation. He was undoubt-
edly spurred by Frankfurter's continuing complaints about the subjective
considerations that some of his colleagues were allowing to guide their
votes 51 and he noted, too, signs of a more aggressive approach by the
Court, especially in the area of electoral reapportionment. 17 Herbert
Wechsler's refined version of "reasoned elaboration," published in
1959, which attempted to clarify the nature of "neutral principles" of
constitutional law, helped suggest a valid criterion with which to distin-
guish legitimate from illegitimate Court decisions. 58 From another direc-
'2 Letter from Bickel to Frankfurter, July 31, 1958 (apparent date), FRANKFURTER
PAPERS, Box 24, Folder 357. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
'3 Bickel, An Inexplicable Document, 139 NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1958, at 9, 11.
See also Bickel, Ninety-Six Congressmen Versus the Nine Justices, 134 NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 23, 1956, at 11-13.
34 Bickel, An Inexplicable Document, 139 NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1958, at 11.
11 Letter from Frankfurter to Bickel, Sept. 29, 1958, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 24,
folder 357.
" See for example the variety of criticism in the following: Frankfurter to Bickel, Feb.
21, 1956, and Frankfurter to Bickel, Dec. 28, 1956, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Box 24, folder
357.
,17 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13.
58 Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HkRv. L. REv. I
(1959).
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tion Learned Hand's sweeping challenge to the very idea of judicial
review, also published in 1959, threatened to undermine Court decisions
that Bickel viewed as necessary. " Hand's lectures were used by politi-
cians anxious to curb the Court, and they seemed to Bickel to demand an
answer. Finally, the election of 1960, in which both presidential candi-
dates had promised to enforce the Brown principle, suggested to Bickel
that at last the more effective and representative executive branch was
ready to take the lead in the desegregation battle. Hence the earlier
activism of the Court might no longer be so crucial. With those considera-
tions in mind, Bickel turned back to Justice Brandeis and his "crowning
statement" in Ashwander v. T. V. A. 60 The result, as might be expected
given the problems he strove to synthesize, was his most elaborate and
challenging theoretical work. 61
Bickel cast the inquiry of The Least Dangerous Branch in terms of
the fundamental tension between the necessity of maintaining social con-
sent and majority rule on the one hand and the practice of constitutional
judicial review on the other. By treating the problem so broadly he hoped
to illuminate a "muted, constant, and timeless" tension within American
political institutions. 6 2 Though the book was marred slightly by his incli-
nation to try to weave together selected pieces of earlier writings, a
practice that often gave his work an episodic quality, Bickel nevertheless
succeeded in elaborating an ingenious theory of the nature and limits of
judicial review.
Although to summarize The Least Dangerous Branch is to do injus-
tice to its greatest strength, its subtlety and sensitivity, the main argument
was clear. Bickel began by rejecting the "found law" theory of Marbury
v. Madison as the basis of judicial review and emphasizing the "root
difficulty" that "judicial review is a deviant institution in the American
democracy." 63 Judical review not only contradicted majority electoral
politics, the "distinguishing characteristic" of American government,
64
but could also become a dangerous and destructive political force, as it
was under the "old" Court, if not confined to a relatively narrow sphere.
The true theoretical justification for judicial review, which also served to
indicate its limits, lay in the fact that American government was also
19 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 225-27
(1952).
60 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
61 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13.
62 Id. at 46.
63 Id. at 16, 18.
64 Id.
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based on "the creative establishment and renewal of a coherent body of
principled rules." 65 And, in practice, Bickel maintained, "courts have
certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures
and executives do not possess." 60 Hence judicial review by the Supreme
Court was valid and necessary, but limited to deciding a constitutional
issue "only on the basis of general principle. ' 67 Yet there was then a
further practical difficulty that a proper theory must encompass for "no
viable society can be principle ridden." 68 There must be leeway -
constitutional leeway - for compromise, expediency, and accommo-
dation.
For Bickel the solution lay in the fact that, when faced with a
constitutional problem, the Court need not either legitimate or invalidate
a principle. "It may do neither and therein lies the secret of its ability to
maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency." 69 The
"passive virtues," as Bickel called them, techniques inspired by Bran-
deis' Ashiwander concurrence and by Frankfurter's whole career, pre-
sented the Court with valid ways to dispose of cases without invoking
principle.7 0 Thus, when the issue was one that demanded expediency,
when there was no "neutral" principle to invoke, or when the Court
sensed some significant social change underway, the passive virtues al-
lowed leeway for desirable practical action while preserving the broader
rule of principle. The passive virtues gave the democratic process a wide
berth, while retaining the checking power if some action transgressed a
truly valid and neutral constitional principle. Given the requirement of
such constitutional principles, however, that ultimate checking power
would be seidom justified.
The immediate upshot was that Bickel had produced a general
theory of judicial restraint that was capable of explaining the legitimacy
of Brown, a decision based on a neutral constitutional principle rooted in
authentic American ideals and enjoying majority political support. It was
"at last quite clear," he wrote, "that the issue is settled, the principle
6 5 Id. at 25.
061d.
87 Id. at 247.
681 d. at 64.
6
9 ld. at 69.
70 Id. at ch. 4. His thesis was originally published as Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). Shortly before his
death Bickel summed up Frankfurter's judicial career in terms of his refinement and use of the
"passive virtues." "He devised all these jurisdictional ways of withdrawing from problems
that were insoluble or that were overly difficult." Quoted in Lash, supra note 24, at 82.
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established and immutable." 71 Indeed, Plessy v. Ferguson, 72 the case
Brown had overruled, simply rested on "an operating principle that was
wrong." 73 In practical terms, too, Bickel's theory provided leeway for
the use of constitutionally questionable "benevolent" quotas, a technique
of reducing racial inequality that was increasingly advocated by civil
rights groups. If the principle of Brown was the invalidity of race as a
legislative criterion, as Bickel believed, then laws that established quotas
for blacks in such areas as employment and housing would have been
unconstitutional. But the passive virtues offered an escape. "Unless and
until experience should belie the hope that may animate benevolent quota
proposals or demonstrate that, rather than a possibly progressive expe-
dient, they are a retrogressive one," he argued, "benevolent quotas
should be allowed their season of leeway, without offense to principle."
That did not call for the Court to give such quotas constitutional sanction,
but demanded "only that it should leave their constitutionality unde-
cided." 74
In spite of its intricate and finely-honed arguments, The Least
Dangerous Branch was riven by serious problems. The treatment of
Supreme Court "deviance" seemed exaggerated and ultimately uncon-
vincing. Bickel himself acknowledged that American government was
not "majoritarian." Indeed, in referring to a norm by which to judge
the deviance, he wavered between an unspecified abstract "democratic
theory" and the less pristine realities of actual American politics. Not
only could one defend judicial review in the simple but nevertheless
meaningful terms of institutionalized checks and balances, but in fact
there was also evidence available to show that judicial review almost
never served as an obstacle to electoral majorities for more than a few
years .75 Perhaps even more curious, however, given the "undemocrat-
ic" deviance "that Bickel emphasized, was his concurrent belief in the
Supreme Court as the "pronouncer and guardian" of the "enduring
values" of American society. The deviant institution was "a great and
highly effective educational institution" entrusted with the ultimate and
authoritative statement of values. 76 "One point is, in any event, of tran-
71 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 268.
72 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
73 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 194.
74 Id. at 71-72.
7' Bickel was well acquainted with the work of the political scientist Robert A. Dahl.
See Bickel, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
76 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 24, 26.
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scendent importance," he declared. "The role of the Court and its raison
d'etre are to evolve 'to preserve, protect and defend' principle."
7 7
Bickel made it clear that the principles he referred to were, or at least
could be, substantive moral principles. While he would later come to
emphasize the more Frankfurterian idea that constitutionality and moral-
ity were almost wholly distinct, Bickel in the early sixties still saw them
as significantly related. In fact, it was precisely its moral vacuum that
marked the limits of James Bradley Thayer's "rule of the clear mistake,"
which limited judicial declaration of unconstitutionality to actions that
were not rationally, i.e. instrumentally, suited to carry out legitimate
purposes.7 8 "It has not always been possible to be satisfied that what is
rational is constitutional," Bickel explained, for the instrumentally ra-
tional might conflict with other values and ideals; "the real question may
be whether it is good." 7 9 Hence constitutional principles must ultimately
be judged by moral principles, "a process in which reason is an indispens-
able aid, but which it cannot carry through unaided," 80 and though the
Constitution itself provided some guides, moral judgment was forced to
become increasingly independent. "Our problems have grown radically
different from those known to the Framers," he insisted, "and we have
had to make value choices that are effectively new." 81
The Court was therefore called upon to create as well as pronounce
moral principles and to give them constitutional stature. "The constitu-
tional function of the Court," he insisted, "is to define values and pro-
claim principles." '8 2 To make the Court not just a formulator of neces-
sary legal rules but rather the "pronouncer" of enduring values, to define
its "transcendent" function as the evolution of constitutional moral prin-
ciples, was to erect an edifice of judicial restraint on the deep foundation
of moral activism. One can imagine Holmes, Hand, and even Frankfurter
blinking. Surely Bickel's own political and moral stance took away al-
most as much from the idea of judicial restraint as his overt theory
prescribed.
Bickel's treatment of moral principles was marred by a revealing
inconsistency. Because of his relativism as well as his desire to limit court
activism, Bickel confined admissible moral principles to those that grew
out of American ideals and rested on "an unquestioned, shared choice of
77 Id. at 188.
78 Id. at 37-45. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
70 Id. at 39.
80 Id.
81 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 39.
82 Id. at 68.
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values." 83 And yet, since he did not wish to force on the court a rigid
adherence to any moral status quo, he proceeded to unlimber his prescrip-
tion. "What is meant, rather," he declared, "is that the Court should
declare as law only such principles as will - in time, but in a rather
immediate forseeable future - gain general assent. ' 84 The Court was
actually to be "at once shaper and prophet of the opinion that will pre-
vail. ' 85 Bickel, in an elaborate prescriptive theory of Supreme Court
behavior, chose to base decision ultimately on a shrewd political judg-
ment of expediency. "The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere
register of it," he summarized, "but it must lead opinion, not merely
impose its own; and - the short of it is - it labors under the obligation
to succeed."
8 6
Additionally, in spite of his relativistic conception of value, Bickel
could not resist placing the ideal of racial equality on an absolute basis.
He declared the principle of Brown to be "immutable," and insisted that
Plessy had been morally "wrong."18 7 But on his own pragmatic criteria,
one could readily argue that Plessy had been morally proper. In reason,
Plessy met the "conventional wisdom" standard 88 : it had been based
presumably on the shared moral values of a large majority;8 9 it had won
the approval both of its time and of a half-century of the future. 90 One
could also readily argue that the "separate but equal" doctrine was itself
a neutral principle. Bickel in arguing the tenative and transitory nature of
principles, had himself claimed that "what one means by the ultimate,
final judgment of the Court is quite frequently a judgment ultimate and
final for a generation or two." 9' He simply made an exception to his
relativism for the moral principle of Brown, without logically justifying
the exception.
In addition to their fundamental morality, Bickel maintained, proper
83 1d. at43.8 4 1d. at 239.
85 Id.
8 6 Id. The episodic and discursive structure of THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH
created its own problems. It was often unclear whether Bickel was speaking in prescriptive
or descriptive terms, whether in this case he was urging the Court to function as a "shaper
and prophet" or merely describing its de facto impact. Though the book as a whole is
clearly a conscious prescription for proper Supreme Court behavior, Bickel at times
suggested that he was only summarizing how the Court operated. See, e.g., id. at 240. This
was an ambiguity that he probably had not fully resolved in his own mind.
87 Id. at71, 194,268.
88 1d. at 53.
8 9 Id. at43.
9 0 
Id. at 239.
91 1d. at 244.
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constitutional principles must also be "neutral." His concept of "neutral-
ity," drawn largely from Herbert Wechsler's formulation, meant that a
principle must be a coherent statement and general proposition, tran-
scending the particular result of any case, and capable by its form of wide
and consistent application. Bickel criticized Shelton v. Tucker, 92 for
example, in which the Court struck down an Arkansas statute requiring
all public school teachers to submit affadavits listing their organizational
affiliations, as representing an unjustified substitution of judicial for
legislative judgment because the Court's opinion lacked "intellectual
coherence" and "was decided without reference to any standard that
could be stated in terms one whit more general than its own result.
' 93
Bickel intended the requirement of neutrality to serve as a powerful
limitation upon the Court's pronouncement of principles: an intellectual
limitation in its demand for coherence and generality, and a practical
limitation in its demand for consistent applicability. "Given the nature of
a free society and the ultimate consensual basis of all its effective law,"
he pointed out, "there can be but very few such principles. ' 94 Yet when
these principles existed, they justified active judicial intervention to up-
hold them; Bickel's basic formulation rested on a kind of circularity for
the theory of "neutral principles" could justify either activism or restaint.
More importantly, the choice between the two in any given context was
to be made on the grounds of practical "applicability," that is, of expe-
diency. In other words, a theory originally intended to distinguish those
issues on which the Court could properly invalidate the acts of representa-
tive political institutions came to rest in large part on the question of the
practical wisdom of so acting. 95 Neutral principles, which seemed at
02 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
03 LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 53, 59. Wechsler's formulation of
the doctrine of "neutral" principles created some misunderstandings. To neither Wechsler
nor Bickel did "neutral" carry the connotation of "value-free." Both men, and especially
Bickel, emphasized that all legal rules and principles implied some type of value judgment.
"Neutral" referred then not to the substance of a principle but to its form: clear, general,
self-consistent, and fairly applicable to a reasonable class of actions. The idea of neutral
principles is sensible and even quite traditional. Its utility is broad, but, like Thayer's rule of
the clear mistake, not unlimited. It is questionable whether an institution such as the
Supreme Court can in practice consistently achieve such "neutrality"; it is also questiona-
ble whether "neutrality" as a formal procedural requirement does not contain substantive
political and moral implications that demand careful analysis. The latter comment is not to
suggest the desirability of a "non-neutral" Supreme Court, but merely to suggest the need
for an examination of how the concept of neutrality in fact functions in any given situation
and in what precise sense it is operating as a "neutral" formal process.
04 1d. at 59.
05 Id. at71.
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times to demand "absolute application" in all like cases "whether or not
it is immediately agreeable or expedient, ' 96 were in practice to be
applied only insofar as the application would be expedient. Since the
existence of a valid neutral principle logically governing a given case did
not automatically command its application, the theoretical grounds for
choice between intervention and non-intervention which Bickel had orig-
inally set out to clarify ultimately eluded his formulation.
Bickel did not believe the judicial process could be "automated,"
and he was not seeking a logically complete or closed system. He was
presenting a prescription for the proper limits of Supreme Court adjudica-
tion. The theory assumed the clear distinction between principle and
expedience, between moral values and practical politics, yet it was that
very distinction that Bickel himself continually blurred. What gave The
Least Dangerous Branch its surface appearance of consistency was not
its logical argument but Bickel's own moral stance. As admirable as that
was, it could make his theory neither logically precise nor consistently
applicable. As advice, as suggestion, as provocation, it was powerful and
weighty. As prescriptive theory, however, it was ultimately amorphous.
Much of Bickel's book focused on the "passive virtues," such
concepts as standing, ripeness, and "case or controversy," that allowed
the Supreme Court to avoid unwise or precipitate constitutional judg-
ment. They were "devices" of expediency and "[could not] themselves
be principled in the sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications
on the merits to be principled." 9 7 Bickel's discussion of the "passive
virtues" and his comments on recent cases were thoughtful, and they had
the virtue of rounding out his general theory of "principled" adjudica-
tion. "These are the techniques that allow leeway to expediency without
abandoning principle," he explained. "Therefore they make possible a
principled government.'' 98
His explanation of the "passive virtues," however, created its own
problems. The first related to the fact that they were often "passive" only
in name, for Bickel's "virtues" served as aggressive instruments for his
chosen values. "The role of principle, when it cannot be the immutable
governing rule," he had argued, "is to affect the tendency of policies of
expediency." 99 The passive virtues, then, were techniques not merely of
avoidance but of "non-principled" but morally purposeful judicial policy
making. Bickel, for example, argued that the Court should have dis-
96 1d. at 59.
97 Id. at 132.
9 8 Id. at71.
99 1d. at 64.
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missed for lack of ripeness Times Film Corp v. City of Chicago,100 a
case in which a city ordinance requiring prior approval of motion pictures
was challenged. "Only one outcome on the merits was open to the Court
on principle - legitimation; and this was unwise in its tendency." 10 1
Though Bickel referred to the specific "intellectual content and intrinsic
significance"'10 2 of the passive virtues, his suggestions for their use were
based primarily on his view of the proper social values they could be used
to support. And he treated those values, even when they were unable to
meet his standards of proper neutral principles, as being important
enough to warrant, as in Times Film, a different disposition than the one
he himself acknowledged to be appropriate on principle.
The second problem, the opposite of the first, was that the "passive
virtues" could occasionally be so amoral as to allow the abandonment of
principle, and of Bickel's own values, in the service of a judgment of
expedience. Though admitting that antimiscegenation statutes "would
surely seem to be governed by the principle of the Segregation Cases,"
Bickel approved the Court's dismissal of proper challenges as
"wise." ' ° If even the Brown principle could be compromised in such
an obvious case, and by Alexander Bickel, what principle would not be
subject to practical erosion by the argument of expedience working with
the "passive virtues?" And by what logically coherent or empirically
verifiable criteria could such "expedience" be judged? If such a "valid"
principle were judged inexpedient in three or four cases, certainly the
precedential basis would be established for a "reformulated" principle.
Surely the root problem lay with the very range of discretion that Bickel
opened up with his "passive virtues" and was unable in his theory to
logically restrict.
Ultimately it is the paradoxical nature of The Least Dangerous
Branch that is its most striking quality. It heralded "immutable" ethical
principles along with an instrumentalist ethical relativism; it based a
theory of judicial restraint on a rationale of moral activism; it called for
principled government and then made expedience dominant; it sought to
prescribe limits of judicial decision-making and then refined elaborate
tools of purposeful judicial discretion. There was a further irony, too, in
that Bickel, who sought to repudiate legal realism, ended by embracing
most of its assumptions. "The judicial process cannot be automated," he
conceded willingly. 10 4 His "passive virtues" were truly "devices," that
100 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
101 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 143.
102 Id. at 170.
103 Id. at 71, 174. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
104 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 207.
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is, tools of instrumental reason that required a previous practical and
moral judgment, independent of the "intrinsic significance" of the de-
vices themselves, that would decide upon and manipulate their use. And
as "principle" was in fact a most uncertain and nondeterminative guide,
it would be pragmatic discretion, and "personal" judicial values, that
would determine their application. To reject the activists, with their as-
sumption of constitutional "clarity," he emphasized the lack of clarity.
To reject the opponents of Brown, who decried the Court's interven-
tionism, he emphasized the necessity of the Court's moral leadership.
And in seeking to protect the Court and the democratic process from one
another, he forced upon the Court the most immediate political judg-
ments. "It is unreal to think that by putting such matters out of view the
Court keeps itself out of politics," he declared. "Actually, it merely
abandons control of the direction in which, inevitably, its decisions on
the merits do influence public opinion and the political institutions." 05
Bickel finished by prescribing to the Court the most careful and contin-
uous political judgments and making it a conscious orchestrator of
social change.
It was no wonder that "tension" was the central metaphor of the
book, and Bickel was probably right that "no attempt to lift the Court out
of the Lincolnian tension can be successful.10 6 His incisive mind illumi-
nated the kinds of problems the Court faced, and his analysis suggested at
innumerable points a sensitive understanding of "timeless" issues. In
many areas, his discussion of the sources of ultimate Supreme Court
judgment, his analysis of the nature of "neutral" principles, and his
emphasis on narrowing and identifying the proper form and place for
moral judgment, he probably described aspects of the judicial process as
well as they can be put in words. It was because the book was deeply
serious, morally responsible, and intellectually weighty, that it will con-
tinue to deserve extended and recurring considerations. It was a pro-
foundly unsatisfying book, but its difficulties were the result of ambitious
and far-reaching intellectual endeavor that must command admiration.
IV
Given the pragmatic emphasis that marked The Least Dangerous
Branch, it was logical that Bickel increasingly turned his attention in the
105 Id. at 140. For a similar and more extensive critique see Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the 'Passive Virtues' - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COL. L. REv. 1 (1964). In his review Mark DeWolfe Howe pointed out the paradox of
moral activism and judicial restraint that suffused TrE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH. Howe,
Book Review, 77 HARv. L. REv. 579 (1964).
106 LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 13, at 131.
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early sixties to the immediate problems the Court and the nation faced.
Contributing regularly to the New Republic, he established a reputation
as one of the country's most thoughtful and independent political com-
mentators. Though his main focus remained the civil rights movement,
he touched broadly on most contemporary political issues that involved
the Court or the legal system. In 1965 he wove together many of his
shorter pieces from the previous ten years and published them under the
title Politics and the Warren Court. 107
In retrospect a transitional work, Bickel's third book echoed his
earlier writings but introduced some new variations. The familiar em-
phasis on the tension between the Court and the politics of democracy
was present, together with Bickel's insistence that the Court provide both
principled and pragmatic leadership. Though he again urged a recogni-
tion of the limits of effective legal action, and especially of judge-made
law, he continued to support persistent judicial enforcement of the Brown
principle. Benevolent quotas still appeared useful and pragmatically
legitimate in spite of the fact that they presented "a difficulty of constitu-
tional logic." 10 8 Bickel had expressed disapproval of large-scale court
ordered busing, but he continued to encourage wide ranging civil rights
litigation and even suggested that the Court could order local officials to
levy taxes for the support of integrated schools.' 09 The moral quality of
the civil rights movement "makes all the difference," he reiterated.
"The cause of the Negro protest movement - the underlying cause, seen
in the large - is just, and that is a decisive judgment we are required to
make." 11 0
In the reforming flush of the mid-sixties Bickel's optimism remained
high. The efforts of the Kennedy administration, though limited, had
brought a new spirit and determination to the civil rights cause, and the
national legislation of 1964 and 1965 altered most favorably the whole
balance of forces. "The essence of the 1965 act, and the source of its
great promise," Bickel happily pointed out, "is that it makes an end run
around the judicial process, and confronts recalcitrant Southern officials
with the real locus of continuously effective federal power, which is the
executive rather than the judiciary. ' 111 The proper tools were finally at
hand; and, in spite of the vast difficulties that remained, their proper use
107 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1.
1
0
8 Id. at 37.
109 Bickel, Beyond Tokenism: The Civil Rights Task That Looms Ahead, 150 NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 4, 1964, at 11, 14; THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 13, 42, note 17.
£10 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 90-91.
'1 Id. at 126.
Alexander Bickel
seemed to guarantee final victory. "Given good faith, or a court order, or
both, desegregation is, after all, a skill, a professional task." '12
Along with the familiar ideas, and an added ground for optimism,
however, newly emphasized caveats crept into the essays. Although Jus-
tice Frankfurter had retired from the Court in August, 1962, he had
continued during the remaining two and a half years of his life to encour-
age Bickel in his criticism of certain "reprehensible decisions" the Court
handed down. Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan of 1937 "was exactly
the consequenee of the kind of behavior by the old Court which you are
now criticizing in the new Court," the Justice insisted. "You law profes-
sors really should sharpen your pens so that there is no mistaking as to
what the trouble is and where the blame lies."' 13 Justice Frankfurter's
retirement, Bickel declared in Politics and the Warren Court, "does
more than merely change a vote; it alters the entire judicial land-
scape."' 4 Although in 1965 he still saw some hope that the post-
Frankfurter Court might exhibit a tone of restraint, he was also disturbed
that an activist "Hugo Black majority" might well be in the process of
coalescing."
5
Bickel warned against the Court's growing tendency to "exaggerate
the requirements of uniformity inhering in national policy" and suggested
that perhaps too much was being changed too quickly." 6 "The Court
needs some respite, and so does the country. 1" 7 There was simply too
much active opposition to recent Court rulings to dismiss it as unimpor-
tant or wholly unfounded."" The rise of a new militancy among civil
rights and liberal groups, the emergence of Black Nationalism, and "the
affinity to nihilism"" ' 9 he detected in many of the younger leaders made
him look more warily at the reform tide of the mid-sixties. More impor-
tantly, Bickel began to see in the sharpening political agitation overtones of
"stark ideological struggle," and believed that the Court was getting
involved in "too much forcing of choices between mutually exclusive
ideological ultimates."' 2 Specifically, Bickel was increasingly dis-
11
2 Id. at 63.
113 Letters from Frankfurter to Bickel, Mar. 18, 1963. and Oct. 8, 1964, FRANKFUR-
TER PAPERS, Box 24, folder 359.
114 THE WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 162.
115 Id. at 163-67, 168.
116 Id. at 161.
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118 Id. at 159-60.
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turbed by the series of reapportionment cases after Baker v. Carr
12 1
which laid down the "one person, one vote" standard. He believed that
judicial application of such a principle was impractical and unwise, and
would constantly draw the courts into areas where they had no busi-
ness.' 22 "The judges are plunged into second-guessing the expedient,
empirical, political judgments of fifty state legislatures decade after de-
cade," he maintained. "This they are unfitted to do," and the frustrating
attempt could only bring them into "disrepute.' '1 23 Bickel could not
resist suggesting, as Frankfurter had argued to him, the analogy with the
"old" Court. Such judicial intervention "was not satisfactory then and it
will not prove satisfactory now.'
1 24
The more critical tone that marked Politics and the Warren Court
became increasingly characteristic in the next few years. 1 25 Bickel was
undoubtedly moved by Justice Frankfurter's death in early 1965, a great
personal and intellectual loss for him. In his eulogy Bickel had pro-
claimed Frankfurter one of the three unquestionably "great" modem
Justices, ranking with Holmes and Brandeis.' 2 6 "Above all there never
was such a friend." Frankfurter "will influence political thought," Bic-
kel declared in a prophecy he would work to fulfill, "so long as there is a
Supreme Court and so long as men are concerned to make their actions fit
the American constitutional tradition." 
27
That the Court was now dominated by a "Hugo Black majority"
was a constant spur. Frankfurter's retirement had helped make a differ-
ence, and in the middle and late sixties there was a "second" Warren
Court, more activist, more innovative, and more sweeping in its deci-
sions. Bickel was particularly distressed by the "vagaries of the subjec-
tive individual judgments" he saw in the Mishkin and Ginsburg obscen-
ity cases, by the "arbitrary" nature of the retroactivity rule adopted for
applying Miranda and by the ever-widening and rigid application of the
"one person, one vote" rule.' 2 8
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The reapportionment cases seemed to him not only rigid and mis-
taken, but also symbolic of a doctrinaire mentality that was hardening
among the Court's "liberal" Justices. In fact, Bickel came to believe,
"liberals" throughout the nation were growing more rigid and "ideologi-
cal" in their politics. They were insisting on the immediate fulfillment of
their ideals, and the ideals were becoming absolutes, chanted but not
analyzed. The result was a politics of abstractions which would prove
disruptive and self-defeating. Though he identified himself in 1965 as a
"confirmed liberal and instinctive Democrat,' '1 29 he began to warn
against the simplistic commitment to egalitarianism and majoritarianism
which he would ultimately see as "a tide flowing with the swiftness of a
slogan."' 30 Liberals had begun to attack the electoral college, for exam-
ple, on abstract majoritarian grounds, yet a clear analysis of the institu-
tion's function revealed that it was in fact "the only effective hold on
power in the federal government that the urban population centers
have."'' x The doctrinaire mentality was endangering liberal goals
everywhere.
More importantly, Bickel's optimism about desegregation began to
wane in the late sixties. While he noted the growing white suburban
opposition to comprehensive desegregation plans, he was more con-
cerned about the fact that the whole civil rights movement had reached a
fundamental turning point. For the challenge had shifted "from the legal
structure of discrimination in the South, which could be dismantled by
law, to conditions of disadvantage in the North, which will not answer to
statutes declaring and enforcing rights."' 132 Resolving the problems
created by de facto segregation and discrimination was "infinitely more
difficult" and could be accomplished only by massive and long term
social reordering. If that were the case, then the courts, which had been
only partly effective in destroying legal discrimination, would be wholly
ineffective in dealing with de facto problems. Bickel feared, too, that the
courts would refuse to recognize their inability and simply make every-
thing worse.'He saw his apprehension confirmed in 1967 when Judge J.
Skelly Wright, a well known judicial "liberal" sitting on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, handed down a
decision condemning the District's whole educational system and de-
l29 Bickel, Liberals and John Lindsay, 153 NEw REPUBLIC, July 3, 1965, at 16.
130 IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 18, at 111.
31 Bickel, The Case for the Electoral College, 156 NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 1967, at
15, 16.
132 Bickel, The Belated Civil Rights Legislation of 1968, 158 NEwv REPUBLIC, Mar.
30, 1968, at 11.
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manding a major restructuring that would significantly increase school
integration. 13 3 Declaring de facto segregation unconstitutional, Bickel
maintained, would discredit the courts without solving any social prob-
lems. There was no possible judicial remedy, and the decision was unwise,
unconvincing and futile. As an indication of the way the courts might begin
to move, it worried Bickel deeply and pushed him to reconsider the whole
problem of court ordered desegregation .134
Finally, the late sixties challenged Bickel's optimism in areas
beyond the issue of desegregation. The social turmoil created by the war
in Viet Nam was sufficiently violent to shake-the faith of many, and
Bickel was hardly alone in seeing "a gathering of crisis of allegiance to the
very system by which we govern ourselves." 135 Identifying Robert F.
Kennedy with the moral tradition of Brandeis, Bickel gave himself to
Kennedy's presidential campaign of 1968 "heart and mind," a commit-
ment that meant "more than any prior political commitment, or than any
conceivable new one." 136 "I believed," Bickel wrote after Kennedy's
death, "that he above all other public men would. . . stop war and heal
suffering" because he "had the trust of those whose trust we desperately
need." The assassination was a profound and personal shock. Though he
counselled against despair, he seemed almost to succumb himself. Ken-
nedy had been an "irreplaceable" leader, for he had come "to know
better and more deeply than anyone how dangerously we are nearing a
dead end.'1 37 The whole experience left its mark, and Bickel sensed
ever more keenly the fragility of the social order and the paramount
necessity of preserving it. In the aftermath of the November elections he
had the time to reflect on the events of the preceding years, and he felt the
necessity of doing so.
V
Fortune provided Bickel a suitable platform from which to announce
his sober reconsiderations. He was invited by the Harvard Law School to
give the annual Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lectures, a prestigious
forum which a number of prominent legal thinkers had used in the past to
133 Hobson v, Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967).
134 Bickel, Skelly Wright's Sweeping Decision, 157 NEw REPUBLIC, July 8, 1967, at
11.







present major statements. Bickel seized the opportunity. By the fall of
1969 he was ready to launch a sweeping attack on both the goals and
methods of the Warren Court. Hailed by one Harvard Law professor as
"blockbuster,"1 38 the lectures were published in an expanded version the
next year as The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress. 39
In many of its specifics the book was familiar, but its tone and
orientation were profoundly different. The insistence on reason and neu-
tral principles, on judicial restraint and democratic primary all remained,
but Bickel was-no longer primarily concerned with exploring their ramifi-
cations. Instead he was determined to build a devastating case against
what he regarded as the intellectual and practical failures of the Warren
Court. As a lawyer's brief the book was slashing and powerful. As the
product of a first-rate, creative mind, it was disappointing. The im-
mediately preceding years had changed Bickel, and the intellectual ten-
sions that had previously energized his thought, the elements that had
given his work its depth and subtlety, were no longer coiled and taut. The
resulting work was overdrawn and one-dimensional.
Abandoning his earlier denigration of the importance of legal realism,
Bickel now argued that a group of "progressive realists," which included
originally both Brandeis and Frankfurter, had begun to dominate Ameri-
can jurisprudence during the early twentieth century and "had come to
power in the late 1930's. ' ' 140 Recognizing that judges indeed "made"
law, they had been caught between their beliefs in democracy and judicial
restraint on the one hand and their belief in their own "fundamentals" on
the other. Even Frankfurter, who struggled conscientiously with the prob-
lem, "never achieved a rigorous general accord between judicial su-
premacy and democratic theory.' ' 14 1 Heirs to part of the "progressive
realist" legacy, the judges of the Warren Court saw themselves as
statesmen making far-reaching policy decisions, whose ultimate validity
would be judged only by their success in molding the desired liberal
future. While in The Least Dangerous Branch Bickel himself had ac-
cepted a similar role for the Supreme Court and a similar standard for
judging its success, by 1969, he had come to believe the role too aggres-
sive and the standard too elusive. Following the ideal of "statesmanship
informed by the judicial intuition of progress," he charged, the Warren
1"8 Quote as reported in Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the
Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 802-03 (1971).
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Court had sought to implement the ideological imperatives of
majoritarianism and egalitarianism, which in turn led to excessive cen-
tralization and legalization. 142 Deeply flawed technique and failure to
generate proper "neutral" principles led the Court into a "web of subjec-
tivity" that discredited the law and disrupted democratic institutions.
Bickel attempted to clinch his argument by pointing out that the desegre-
gation and reapportionment cases were "heading toward obsolescence,
and in large measure abandonment" because they had brought social
results that were self-defeating and because they were proving to be
mutually contradictory, not in the Court's imagined future but in the real
future that was about to arrive.
143
Though Bickel scored some forceful points, the overall analysis was
unfair. He dealt only with a small number of cases, including some that
were hardly of the greatest social significance. Many of his readings were
at best arguable, and some were unconvincing. He cited Katzenbach v.
Morgan,1 44 for example, to demonstrate the Court's centralizing aid
majoritarian tendencies, yet in that case the Court had upheld Congres-
sional legislation intended to guarantee Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Indeed, he might just as easily have cited the case as an example of
admirable self-restraint by the "deviant" branch in a democratic system.
Morgan only demonstrated once again that judicial passivity could be as
politically significant as judicial activism, a principle which Bickel had
previously recognized as fundamental. Moreover, major occasions of
Warren Court activism which Bickel endorsed, including the early de-
segregation decisions and the criminal procedure and free speech cases,
were either downplayed or ignored. Miranda v. Arizona, 145 for exam-
ple, one of the most widely condemned decisions in the history of the
Court, merited Bickel's approval as "a radical, if justifiable, depar-
ture." 146 The method of his criticism, stretching some cases out to their
logical limits and narrowing others sharply, had an element of the arbi-
trary about it. Very likely any court at any time could have been convicted
by the same techniques, and Bickel acknowledged that he was unsure
whether the craftsmanship of the Warren Court was really below that of
its predecessors. In any case, he maintained, such a comparison "really
does not matter one way or the other, for intellectual incoherence is not
excusable and is no more tolerable because it has occurred before.'
1 47
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Though Bickel was ready to condemn the Court for its "intellectual
incoherence," his own standards of judgment were rather confusing.
There was, in fact, an apparent paradox operating throughout The Su-
preme Court and the Idea of Progress, for Bickel retained the idea of
"principle" as the justification for the Court's purpose at the very time he
himself was losing faith in it. "The Court is the place for principled
judgment," he reiterated, emphasizing that it was "the place only for
that." '1 48 He charged the Warren Court with failing to develop
adequately neutral principles on which to base its decisions, and at times
seemed to assume that truly valid principles must be almost absolute and
inflexible in their application as, for example, when he condemned the
"one person, one vote" rule to ultimate obsolescence because it created
absurdities when carried to its universal, unqualified extreme.
1 49
Yet even as he held this standard of principled adjudication up to the
Court, Bickel was beginning to doubt the utility and even the existence of
actual principles. He urged the Court "to define principle in the nar-
rowest possible compass," and to approach it "through a line-drawing
process, case by case."' 50 That was surely sage common law advice, but
if it were followed very few cases would contain truly neutral principles.
Elsewhere Bickel praised a series of free speech cases that were "made
on thinly distinguishable sets of facts," which were "often narrow to the
point of being virtually ad hoc," and which "do not in the aggregate
amount to a generalizable proposition."' 5 ' But despite this lack of any
discernible, let alone neutral, principle, Bickel defended them as "not
analytically vulnerable" and "in contrast to the erratic and apparently
inarticulate subjectivity of the Court's obscenity decisions."' 52 If this
were true of cases that lacked any "generalizable proposition," what had
happened to the idea of principle as the touchstone of judicial propriety?
As far as a justification for judicial review, at least, his answer was clear.
"I have come to doubt in many instances the Court's capacity to develop
'durable principles', and to doubt, therefore, that judicial supremacy can
work and is tolerable in broad areas of social policy.'
'1 53
In his critique of the Warren Court the paradox of upholding the
principled ideal but denying its practicability allowed him to attack from
front and rear; on a deeper level, however, the paradox disappeared, for
148 Id. atS7 (emphasis added).
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Bickel was restricting the Court even more severely by limiting the per-
missible scope and number of valid constitutional principles. The real sin
of the Warren Court was not its technical failure to elaborate principles,
but rather its frequent invocation of the very name principle. Though
Bickel cited The Least Dangerous Branch for its techniques of rationally
avoiding principle, 154 he was, more significantly, undermining the foun-
dation of moral activism that his earlier work had accepted.
Bickel was not only reconsidering the utility of neutral principles,
but was also beginning to fear their very assertion. The Court had pro-
voked only mild opposition with its narrow criminal procedure cases, he
noted. "It headed into trouble after the strongly, and as one may think
soundly, principled decision in Miranda v. Arizona." 5 5 He had thus
come to doubt the advisability of the Court's asserting a principle which
he accepted, in a case which he admired, in an area of law which he
regarded as uniquely within the purview of the Supreme Court. While
principle alone justified the Court's unique functions, it was piinciple
itself that presented a special "source of danger to the survival of the
institution.' 15
Bickel's newly deepened skepticism and distrust of principle grew
from three sources. The first was his increasing belief in the sheer com-
plexity of society and the consequent inability of men to manage it effi-
ciently. The frustrating fifteen year effort to implement Brown discour-
aged him and seemed to confirm his general conviction, from which he
had in part excepted desegregation, that judge-made law was ineffective
in dealing with large social issues. "What the Brown opinion ultimately
envisioned seems for the moment unattainable, and is becoming un-
wanted." 11 7 Social change could effectively come, he now believed,
only from the evolution of a society's "full tradition, in all its contradic-
tions" - a glacial process that could be neither fully directed nor sig-
nificantly hastened.15 8 Though Bickel had always given weight to the
demands of tradition, he now saw it as much more intractable and rigidly
determinative. No "principle-prone and principle-bound" judicial
methodology could possibly direct such a process.1 59 In addition, Bic-
kel's faith in the vitality of an underlying structure of American ideals
had withered in the heat of the social turmoil of the late sixties. There was
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a fragmentation of groups and of values, Bickel maintained, and basic
moral concepts no longer united most Americans. "The words are used
in a different sense now because they are no longer rooted in a single,
well-recognized ethical precept."' 16 0 The public schools, for example,
had become "rigorously devoid of any religious - or, as some would
say, moral - content."' 16 ' In fact, what he saw as social and moral
fragmentation struck him so forcefully, that he even rejected the
Brandeisian-Frankfurterian ideal of the secular, egalitarian public school
as the generator of democratic, unifying values. "The ideal seems, as the
public schools pursue it, increasingly illusory and myth-ridden," he
charged.' 6 2 In a society so fragmented that its major institutions for
socialization and change had miserably failed, there seemed few if any
moral principles for which the Court could gain broad acceptance.
Finally Bickel's growing skepticism about the utility of principles
was rooted in his new suspicion that they could become "ideological."
The kind of broad moral principles he had defended in The Least
Dangerous Branch now seemed no longer rationally limitable, or possi-
bly even defensible. Drawing orr the Holmesian-Frankfurterian condem-
nation of absolutes, 163 and distressed by both the broad applications of
doctrine by the Warren Court and the aggressive moral rhetoric of the late
sixties, Bickel began to conceive of principles as absolutistic, moralistic
imperatives that drove men to uncompromising social conflict. He could
draw on a large body of social science literature that defined and con-
demned such "ideological" attitudes; when morally based constitutional
principles came to 'seem "ideological," they became by definition
dangerous and destructive. If principles were in practice "ideological,"
and if the justification for the Court remained the elaboration of principle,
then the Court inevitably appeared even more suspect and potentially
disruptive than it had earlier.
The only solution for the social and moral fragmentation he saw in
America lay in the wholly non-"ideological" politics of pluralism. By
accepting the variety of groups in America, each with its own interests
and values, and by allowing them to reach their owm compromises with
one another, a workable and tolerable form of self-government was pos-
sible. The United States enjoyed "a system in which all groups have
access to political power," Bickel maintained, one which was free, open,
160 Id. at 84.
161 Id. at 137.
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and flexible. 1 4 The enforcement of black voting rights in the fifties and
sixties seemed to have eliminated the one major imperfection in the
system. "So long as the process is operational and both diffuses power
and allows majorities to work their will," he concluded, "no group that
is prepared to enter into the process and combine with others need remain
permanently and completely out of power. ' 165 The existing system,
pragmatic, largely unprincipled, and basically just, could thus preserve
and even improve itself, but only if it were free from the frequent coer-
cion of principle either from the Court or any other "ideological" force.
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel'had seen the courts as the
special voice of reason, uniquely suited to elaborate proper principles; the
political process had appeared erratic and given to excess. When princi-
ples became "ideological" in the late sixties and Bickel's primary goal
shifted from achieving moral reform to ensuring social tranquility, the
judgment had to be reversed. The judiciary became erratic, the political
system rational. The democratic process scarcely needed the checking
power of principles because it possessed its own checking power - the
politics of balancing groups. Bickel's anti-ideological relativism com-
bined with his altered political focus to transform the rigidity of the
political system and the massive power of organized economic groups
into great democratic goods. Instrumental reason, which constantly ap-
pealed to reality to justify its conclusions, once more concluded by con-
ceiving of that reality as a reflexively validating rational structure. If the
Warren Court imagined the past, Bickel imagined the present.
His sanguine view of pluralism, though necessary for his theory,
was based on the most dubious of assumptions. It completely ignored the
economic institutions that dominated policy decisions as well as the gross
inequality among the "groups" that existed in American society. Bickel
spoke of a new movement for a Brandeisian decentralization; yet, unlike
Brandeis, he refused to confront the real loci of concentrated power in the
United States and refused to demand the decentralization of economic
institutions. He called for a realistic analysis of American politics, disre-
garding the fact that "pluralism" simply meant that the wealthier, more
powerful, and better organized groups would continue to dominate gov-
ernment. And though he acknowledged the power of these elites, he
attempted to overcome potential objections by asserting that elections
always "influence" and "sometimes" even "determine" public policy
anyway, 1 66 despite his own recognition in the course of his attack on the
104 Id. at 86.
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"one person, one vote" rule that the "majoritarian" assumption that
"legislative policy is really made in elections" was "hardly realis-
tic." 167 In effect, Bickel, who continually emphasized the complexity of
social problems, was willing to settle for a view of pluralism that was
simplistic and mechanical.
This pluralist perspective, which played an increasingly crucial role
in Bickel's thought, was the source of his attack on "majoritarianism".
He mounted a substantial attack on the "one person, one vote" principle
by showing the ways in which it could conflict with other important and
valid political) considerations. The attack was ultimately unconvincing,
however, for in his determination to convict the Warren Court and its
defenders of "uncompromising majoritarianism" he overdrew his in-
dictment. 168 The "one person, one vote" rule was, after all, only a kind
of minimal constitutional requirement and not an example of minute and
detailed judicial control. It left wide flexibility for ensuring the representa-
tion of different groups; though it could not end gerrymandering, it could
make grossly unfair districting more difficult. Again, the minimal "one
person, one vote" requirement would hardly interfere with the "real"
politics of pluralism, nor did it make American government "majori-
tarian" in any fundamental or radically new sense. In fact, to the extent
that Bickel insisted that "our government is not, and ought not be, strictly
majoritarian, ' 169 his general case for the essentially undemocratic "de-
viance" of the Supreme Court's tradition of judicial review was signif-
icantly weakened.
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress marked a significant
change in Bickel's work. No longer did he emphasize the centrality of
broad and generally accepted principles, but rather the conflict between a
variety of diverging principles and the difficulties of their application. It
was impossible to make a principled judgment between principles, and it
was equally impossible to reduce su6h complex judgments to any kind of
clear rule. As a result, he concluded, "we do not confine the judges, we
caution them. That, after all, is the legacy of Felix Frankfurter's
career." 1 7 0 Perhaps it was because he believed one could only "caution"
judges that he came to caution them so forcefully. And though he retained
his personal commitment to full racial equality, he seriously doubted it
would be achieved in the forseeable future. The social problems of the
day seemed more and more intractable, and he accepted C. Vann Wood-
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ward's suggestion that the "Second Reconstruction" was coming to an
end, He no longer believed, as he had in 1956, that time "in the long run
works for integration, and what is more, for integration under optimum
conditions." 17' He was increasingly concerned about disruptiveness of
change and major criticisms of American society now seemed primarily
"ideological". The necessity for stability and compromise moved to the
center of his thought, and he was soon speaking of the nation's future in
terms of "the mystery of survival."
172
During his last few years Bickel remained politically "liberal" on
many issues. He continued to oppose the war in Viet Nam, criticized the
Nixon administration's crime and anti-busing bills, supported attempts to
reform the Democratic party, and argued for the assertion of Congres-
sional authority over foreign policy issues. 17 3 Much of his ardor had
waned, though, and his writings were frequently filled with cautions and
caveats. On racial issues he continued to encourage the attack on the
vestiges of legally supported segregation, but emphasized more and more
the crucial difference between ending segregation and achieving actual
integration. Busing, for example, often led to white "flight" and helped
foster a defacto resegregation that was impossible for the law to prevent.
Increasing black demands for community control of the schools con-
vinced him that an uncompromising drive toward integration would be a
disservice to both races. The most workable solution for the immediate
future, he came to believe, would be to emphasize decentralization and
community control of schools, to provide large-scale federal aid to im-
prove general educational quality, and to encourage the voluntary transfer
of students to schools in which their race was in a minority.' 7 4 He now
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reversed his earlier position on "benevolent" quotas, too, and con-
demned them as socially inefficient and morally wrong.
175
More and more Bickel came to base his judgments, as Frankfurter
had, on the primary need for protecting the independence and integrity of
the judicial process. He attacked the Nixon administration's crime bill
not just because it ignored underlying social causes of crime but because
it unfairly and opportunistically blamed the courts and proposed limiting
their authority.' 7 6 Similarly, he rejected the administration's anti-busing
bill because it deprived the federal courts of substantial elements of their
constitutional power. "Much as I agree that the courts have gone substan-
tially wrong of late in administering the rule of Brown v. Board of
Education by tending to view mass integration as the be-all and end-all of
school policy," he wrote in 1972, "I deplore as more destructive than the'
worst of busing the attempt to work such a reallocation of powers between




Bickel's central concern with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process manifested itself equally in his work on The Study Group on the
Caseload of the Supreme Court. One of seven prominent lawyers ap-
pointed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1972 to investigate ways to
cope with the steadily increasing number of appeals filed with the Court,
Bickel supported several recommendations including the controversial
proposal to establish a new National Court of Appeals which would
screen all cases carried to the Supreme Court and render judgment on a
significant number. 1 78 In dealing with the problem of the burgeoning
case load, Bickel believed, the real threat to judicial integrity came from
Court activists and those cynical realists who believed that "the task of
decision is more an individual administrative or executive event than a
collective scholarly and deliberative process." ' 17 9 Emphasizing the pro-
priety of the latter view, as he had done in The Unpublished Opinions,
Bickel insisted that the Court's workload must be cut drastically so that
the reflective process of "collegial deliberation" would be given time to
175 Bickel, More on Quotas, 167 NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 1972, at 8. See also
MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 131-34. Bickel argued in support of prohibiting
racial quotas on constitutional grounds before the Supreme Court in 1974. He was co-
counsel with Philip Kurland for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, on its amicus
curiae brief in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
176 Bickel, How to Beat Crime, 161 NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 1969, at 10.
177 Bickel, What's Wrong with Nixon's Busing Bills?, 166 NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22,
1972, at 19.
178 A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1973).
17 9 Id. at 27.
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operate. That process alone justified judicial review, and was the very
essence of the ideal of a rational legal system. "If we should let it reach
the point of breakdown or, taking the term 'machinery' seriously, let it
transform itself into a high-speed, high-volume enterprise," he declared,
"we would mock the idea of justice and mock the substantive reforms of
a generation." 180 Whatever the admitted drawbacks to limiting more
rigorously the number of cases the Court would hear, they did not out
weigh the primary good of ensuring the conditions that would allow the
process of reason, Henry Hart's "maturing of collective thought," to
function in the formation of constitutional law.
Bickel's commitment to, and near equation of, reason and pro-
cedural regularity served as the foundation for the attempt he made in his
last years to elaborate a broader political philosophy. He recognized the
institutional failures involved in the government's Viet Nam policy and
in the Watergate episodes, and feared that the succeeding waves of social
protest and disobedience "carried the clear and present danger of anar-
chy."'18 1 His essays increasingly pleaded for reason and restraint in so-
cial affairs, and his method for achieving them was adherence to a pro-
cedural regularity that would bind the while society. When he supported
meaningful Congressional involvement in foreign policy, for example, he
did so not because he thought Congress would necessarily prove wiser
than the Executive but because he believed new legislation could estab-
lish procedures that would ensure a greater scope to rational discussion.
"The only assurance there is lies in process," he argued, "in the duty to
explain, justify and persuade, to define the national interest by evoking it,
and thus to act by consent.
' 1 8 2
As the Watergate prosecutions unfolded, Bickel continued to insist
on procedural rigor and pointed to the possible dangers involved in ques-
tionable legal moves designed to facilitate prosecution. Though he came
to believe in the President's probable culpability, he maintained that the
politically representative Congress should carry the burden of an orderly
impeachment effort and that the Courts should become involved only on
such clearly and technically "legal" issues as determining the specific
relevance of subpoenaed material to alleged criminal acts.
183
180 Id. at 27, 37.
181 MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 119.
182 Bickel, The Need for a War-Powers Bill, 166 NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1972, at
18.
'83 See Bickel, The Tapes, Cox, Nixon, 169 NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1973, at 13;
Bickel, What Now?, 169 NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1973, at 13; Bickel, Impedchment, 169
NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1973, at 9; Bickel, How Might Mr. Nixon Defend Himse?,
170 NEW REPUBLIC, June 1, 1974, at 11.
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Fully aware of his declining health and impending death, Bickel
devoted his last months to completing his final book, a conscious sum-
ming up of his political philosophy of procedure. He put the finishing
touches on The Morality of Consent only a week before he died. Though
the tragic haste of preparation revealed itself in the book's unevenness,
Bickel succeeded in producing a humane and worthy last testament.
The Morality of Consent focused on the paramount necessity of
preserving an open, democratic political process in the face of institu-
tional and ideological pressures to close it down. He had earlier criticized
the Warren Court for its lack of "pragmatic skepticism" and now he
extended the charge broadly.' 8 4 America was experiencing a period of
social chaos, he argued, because "the moral element in countless politi-
cal issues is singled out as decisive so often by so many.' 18 5 The Su-
preme Court and much of American society were infected with the ideol-
ogy of "liberal contractarian moralism," a conviction "that society must
bend to a catechism of principles, hence a moralism not a little infected
with authoritarianism.' '1 86 A politics of moralistic absolutism or of
"ideological" imperatives led not only to coercion and disruption, but
also to the ultimate destruction of any real "politics." "Our problem,"
he declared, "is the totalitarian tendency of the democratic faith.'
'1 87
The only solution for such chaos, the only way to restore an effective and
peaceful democratic politics, was to embrace pragmatic skepticism,
moral relativism, group "pluralism," and the method of compromise and
accommodation. Values and ideals were still essential, but their full
realization was doubtful and could only come through the gradual evolu-
tion of a society's whole cultural tradition. Politics must be guided by the
"computing principle," the careful calculation of the proper balance to
be drawn between culturally authenticated moral considerations and the
demands of expedience determined by existing groups and institutions.
The pursuit of any kind of absolute was foolish and dangerous. "Better to
recognize from the first," he maintained, "that the computing principle
is all there is, ought to be, or can be."' 188
In elaborating his relativistic theory of democracy Bickel drew on
the intellectual skepticism of Frankfurter and especially of Holmes for
support. Revealingly, Brandeis, whom Bickel continued to admire, had
no real place in his last book, for Brandeis was too much identified in
184 Bickel, Close of the Warren Era, 161 NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1969, at 13, 16;
MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 8.
185 MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 95.
186 Id. at7.
187 Id. at 12.
188 Id. at 88. See also id. at 11-25.
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Bickel's mind with morally based reform. Instead, Bickel turned to Ed-
mund Burke as an authority testifying against the evils of moralistic
absolutism. His extended appeal to Burke's authority was grounded in a
conventional view of the Englishman as the far-sighted father of modem
philosophical conservatism, the spokesman for pragmatic change when
change became unavoidable. Bickel's newly announced reverence was
based, however, not on a comprehensive historical understanding, but
rather on the utility of some of Burke's writings for reinforcing the views
that Bickel himself had independently decided to promote. Occasionally
his effort to invoke Burke's traditionalism led him to preciosity, as when
he approved Burke's concern for organic local units and the individual's
sense of the "glory of belonging to the Chequer No. 71.?"18 Not only
was such a view simply irrelevant to most problems of contemporary
electoral districting, but it revealed the distance Bickel had travelled in
ten years. "Any given neighborhood," he had declared in Politics and
the Warren Court, "is, after all, an arbitrary construct, the trace at some
time of somebody's pencil on a map." 190
Bickel's self-conscious "conservatism" was actually rooted, not in
Burke, but in his pragmatic skepticism and full acceptance of the theory
of political "pluralism" which had come to dominate American social
theory in the forties and fifties. At the foundation of "pluralism" were
the beliefs that all absolutes were dangerous (thus transforming the old
pragmatic hostility to metaphysics into an attack on all "ideology"); that
American society was a morally relativistic society functioning through
decentralized groups; and that the existing social order was basically
flexible and just. Bickel accepted all those beliefs, and they came to
dominate his thinking in the late sixties at precisely the time "pluralism"
was coming under heavy attack as an ideology of the status quo that
ignored the de facto injustices and concentrations of power that existed in
America. The Morality of Consent represented a restatement of
'pluralism" wholly self-conscious ot its function as a support for an
endangered status quo.
Bickel was not, however, simply a defender of the status quo. The
argument of The Morality of Consent was more complex. Although his
focus was on preservation and he accepted the existing cultural tradition
as the basis of moral good, Bickel was not seeking a repressive, change-
less, or closed society. He was , in fact, seeking ways to guarantee the
189 Id. at 17.
100 THF WARREN COURT, supra note 1, at 35. In his 1965 book Bickel had been much
less concerned with the problem of social stability: "The condition of the Negro, cruelly
neglected for so long, cannot be remedied all at once. Until it is, we deserve no peace." Id.
at 90.
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greatest possible political openness within a firmly established set of
institutions. The tragic haste with which the book was finished undoubt-
edly prevented him from reconciling his ideas more fully, but once again
Bickel was exploring institutional tensions, and hence the book fre-
quently sparkled with his characteristic insights.
His discussion of civil disobedience, partially adapted from earlier
essays, is one example. Bickel there encouraged considerable leeway for
forces of social protest and defended a variety of forms of civil disobedi-
ence, while maintaining that the legal system's "fundamental premise is
that its own stability is itself a high moral value, in most circumstances
the" highest.'' 91 The ground for distinguishing legitimate from illegiti-
mate civil disobedience was the extent to which each instance was an,
appeal directed somewhere within the system - to its laws, its judicial
hierarchies, its accepted principles - and the extent to which it was an
appeal against, or wholly independent of, the system itself. "Therefore,
the use of civil disobedience, not to redress grievances on the assumption
of the continued operation of the system and by plausible appeal to its
own principles, but against it," he declared, "ought not be tolerated." 
192
Bickel was trying to institutionalize a wide range of social protest, to
protect dissent by channelling it, to strengthen institutions by keeping
them flexible.
The underlying irony of The Morality of Consent lay in the fact that
Bickel had obviously failed, as he admitted Frankfurter had failed, in
achieving any "rigorous general accord between judicial supremacy and
democratic theory." ' 193 Bickel, reacting to the threat of social disorder,
now accepted a greater activism on the part of the Court as the guardian
of the democratic political process. He placed a new emphasis on the
Court's duty "to make the political process work" by guaranteeing First
Amendment rights194 which differed in tone from much of his earlier
work in two ways. First, he treated the Court's role in preserving rights as
more crucial in practice than he had earlier. Second, by accepting the
criterion of making the political process work which he had rejected as a
justification for some Warren Court decisions, he embraced a test that
was as indeterminate in application as it was sensible in principle. 195 It
did hot, in other words, "rigorously" delimit any proper area of Court
intervention.
Even more revealing, Bickel attacked the occasional practice of
19' MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 120.
1
9 2 Id. at 117-18.
193 IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 18, at 34.
194 MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 62.
195 Id. at 62-63.
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using "citizenship" as a substantive constitutional concept on the
grounds that it was "metaphysical" and capable, therefore, of being used
to deprive "persons" of their constitutional rights. Protection of "per-
sons," not "citizens," he maintained, was the "authentic voice" of the
Constitution. 190 As a consequence he urged the courts to strike down
legislative attempts to violate that "authentic voice." He was primarily
attacking the Warren Court and its supporters who had occasionally em-
phasized the importance of citizenship, but his emphasis was on the Court
as a more active protector of individual rights. 197
The book was filled with shrewd as well hs questionable judgments
on individual questions. His discussion of civil disobedience, the doctrine
of citizenship, and the role of a free press were forceful and persuasive.
His analyses of "liberal contractarianism" and of the role of the Warren
Court's activisim in setting the stage for the lawlessness of Watergate
were not." 8 Perhaps the central intellectual failing of the book, however,
was Bickel's unwillingness to deal with the intellectual challenge the
nineteen sixties presented and his consequent readiness to embrace more
fully an outmoded theory of pluralism. In his quite legitimate and war-
ranted concern with social disruption and turmoil he ignored the fact that
the sixties had been exciting and crucial not just because of the political
activism but also because the activism had been related to and, in some
indirect part, had grown out of new ideas. The sixties had witnessed the
exposure of the complicated and profound institutional interrelationships
between government, the universities, the military, and the business
community, an exposure that could no longer be ignored if one wanted to
discuss the "realities" of American politics. The sixties witnessed the
culmination of a broad and powerful philosophical critique of the idea of
"objectivity," not only in the social sciences but also in the "hardest" of
the physical sciences as well. The sixties witnessed a concomitant chal-
lenge to the idea of a neutral, professional administrative elite that could
116 Id. at 47.
107 Id. at ch. 2. Bickel was criticizing such Warren Court opinions a Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1957) (Warren, J., dissenting), where the doctrine of the
substantive nature of citizenship was expressed by the Chief Justice, and Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967), in which the earlier dissent "became the prevailing view." MORAL-
tTY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 52. Bickel also undoubtedly had in mind the broad
interpretation of the Warren Court written by his colleague Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.,
which made the substantive concept of citizenship central to the Constitution. See Black,
The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970).
10 For the unpersuasive and disappointing attempt to argue this relationship, see
MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 5, at 121-22.
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be entrusted with the "efficient" and "value-free" administration of the
public business. Ultimately the sixties witnessed the spread of new ideas
that challenged the very concept of "reason" itself, not ideas that denied
"reason" as something distinct from "subjectivism" or "instinctivism"
but ideas that nevertheless called for a reconsideration of the nature and
scope of that distinction. While many aspects of the decade represented
trivial faddism, personal self-indulgence, and even sterile solipsism,
there were also serious developments that called for a profound rethink-
ing. Those Bickel ignored. He was still willing, for example, to contrast
"neutral" standards with "political" ones and to equate "anti-
professional" with "anti-intellectual" as though those distinctions had
never been meaningfully challenged. 199
Had Bickel enjoyed a longer life he would undoubtedly have turned
to the intellectual challenges the sixties offered and considered them with
his usual thoughtfulness. Certainly his analysis would have been insight-
ful and his judgments independent. His wide and varied audience will
miss that reconsideration acutely.
VI
Alexander Bickel was not a seminal figure, nor did he offer any
large or exciting visions. He chose rather to operate within an already
established tradition and to refine and adapt its assumptions to changing
conditions. Further, the tradition he chose confined his speculative range
even more by its consciously narrow professional technique and its con-
scientiously rigorous self-limitation. His analytical powers and forceful
style guaranteed him an audience, but the tradition he accepted and the
theoretical refinements he emphasized limited his appeal. Bickel made
too many unpopular assumptions. He experienced a kind of sterile prom-
inence, therefore, always looming as a powerful figure not to be ignored
but seldom fully persuading or inspiring his audience to follow him. He
did, however, splendidly fill the role of the committed and independent
intellectual, the professional and social critic who continually stimulated
others and challenged their easy judgments. His opinions were always
worth considering, and it is more than likely that in future times his work
will be profitably and forcefully revived.
In a field where it is so much easier to attack than defend, Bickel
formulated through his lifetime one of the most sophisticated and fully
considered theories of constitutional adjudication ever produced. He had
199 Id. at 128, 134.
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the tenacity to constantly test his ideas against changing social reality and
the courage to change or modify them when he thought it necessary. He
frequently succeeded in illuminating enduring problems in a way that will
itself prove enduring. His commitment to the ideal of reason, and the
broad humanity that lay behind it, will continue to inspire his successors,
whether they specifically accept or reject the substance of his analysis.
One might hazard the guess that in the long run his reputation as a legal
theorist will rest on his problematic but fascinating The Least Dangerous
Branch rather than on the broader but more conventional final effort, The
Morality of Consent, and that his reputation as a constitutional historian
will rest on the masterful Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis
rather than on the more spectacular but thinner Supreme Court and the
the Idea of Progress. Such judgments must remain tentative, however,
for the incisive and perennially relevant quality of Bickel's work will
attract and merit serous reconsiderations as long as the process of judicial
review remains a part of the structure of American government.
